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that EA policymakers could borrow important lessons from the stabilising role of a number of fi scal institutions in the United States, but that they are not what policymakers typically envision, based on the mainstream narrative dominated by the focus on the absorption of asymmetric shock through fi scal policy.
Fiscal policy and asymmetric shocks: do automatic stabilisers really function better in the US?
We start out by measuring the share of an asymmetric shock to GDP that is absorbed by domestic fi scal policy across the Atlantic. Obviously, fi scal policy remains a domestic prerogative in the EA, while in the US it is embedded in a multi-tier dimension across different government levels. Since the vast majority of cyclically sensitive fi scal policy items are administered by the US federal budget, we assume that the smoothing effects of state and local government budgets are null and focus exclusively on the role of US federal institutions. Indeed, past studies 2 have shown that the stabilisation capacity of states and local government budgets is negligible or even destabilising. 3 Conversely, the structural nature of transfers from the EU budget implies that they have negligible stabilising properties.
The classic argument for a euro area "fi scal capacity", understood in this contribution as a centralised fi scal stabiliser, revolves around the need to dampen the effects of asymmetric shocks. According to those preaching this conventional wisdom, a common fi scal stabiliser designed along the lines of the US federal fi scal system would have stabilised incomes in member states hit the hardest, thereby avoiding the divergence that has unfolded in the aftermath of the financial crisis between the South, led by Italy and Greece, and the North, led by Germany and the Benelux countries.
This article sets out to contribute to the debate by questioning the above-mentioned hypothesis, namely that the euro area (EA) needs a fi scal capacity in order to improve its capacity to deal with asymmetric shocks. 1 We argue 
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Forum cit) divergences since the sovereign crisis emerged, an important question is whether the degree of stabilisation is homogenous across member states, or whether significant discrepancies exist. Not surprisingly, our estimates reveal that fi scal insurance is weaker in the periphery of the EA: direct fi scal transfers stabilise twice as much in the core (27%) as in the periphery (11%). Unemployment benefi ts smooth out about seven per cent of an asymmetric shock in the core, which is about twice as much as in the periphery and seven times larger than in the US. More detailed results (not reported) suggest that this gap was further exacerbated during the sovereign debt crisis.
Interestingly, and despite the different degrees of generosity of welfare benefi ts across states, such a pattern is not encountered when comparing poor and rich US states. The amount of fi scal risk sharing appears highly homogenous -formly low -across rich and poor states and net recipients of and contributors to federal fi scal transfers. In other words, poorer states, defi ned as those below the median gross state product (GSP) per capita, feature similar degrees of smoothing through the federal budget as richer states. The same observation holds when distinguishing between net recipients of and net contributors to federal transfers. One interpretation is that most transfers are indeed not designed to achieve fi scal risk sharing or stabilise output fl uctuations, but rather are generally guided by the structural features of the transfer system (state income level, demographics, presence of US military bases, US federal institutions). As far as the In order to measure the insurance role of US and EA government budgets against asymmetric shocks, we update the study by Asdrubali et al. 4 on the channels of risk sharing in the US and extend the work of Arreaza et al. 5 on the smoothing effect of government budgets in EU countries. This approach further allows us to quantify the smoothing effect of different components of the tax and transfer systems, focussing particularly on unemployment benefi ts. 6 Our estimates appear to dismiss the widespread view that EA members lack the capacity of the US federal institution to stabilise asymmetric output fl uctuations (Figure 1) . Indeed, EA members smoothed nearly twice as much of an asymmetric shock (19.8%) as the US federal budget did through inter-state risk sharing (11%) in 1995-2013. Unemployment benefi ts play a negligible role in the US, cushioning barely one per cent of output shocks, while in the EA11 unemployment benefi ts provide fi ve per cent of insurance.
These results qualify the presumed superiority of US federal stabilisers over the EA's decentralised fi scal policies when dealing with asymmetric shocks. A number of factors explain these results. First, most federal fi scal transfers to states, particularly grants, are structural (and often pro-cyclical) rather than cyclical in nature and have little to do with buffering state-specifi c macroeconomic fl uctuations. Second, fi scal policy in the US has historically relied more heavily on discretionary fi scal policies and less on automatic stabilisation as compared to the EA. However, the more minimalist character of the US welfare state compared to EA welfare states only partially accounts for the lower level of asymmetric shock absorption through fi scal policy. 7 When adjusting the coeffi cient estimate of fi scal policy by spending size (or total tax revenue), we fi nd that the larger budgets of euro area members do not explain this trend alone. Indeed, the EA members' budgets appear to outperform the US in terms of "effi ciency" for all budget items.
Since the lack of a common EA fi scal stabiliser is often cited as having fostered North-South (or surplus vs. defi - Forum the US fared better during the fi nancial crisis as a result of the capacity of the US federal tax-transfer system to transfer resources to states that were hardest hit during the fi nancial crisis. Rather, it seems that fi scal reactions to crises in the US carry an important element of insurance against common shocks. It is important to stress that joint fi scal expansion is not a zero-sum game on aggregate: it also allows states to internalise cross-border fi scal policy externalities, specifi cally the effect of demand stimulus on states that are trade partners.
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Unemployment insurance in the US: a semiautomatic stabiliser with limited risk pooling
Another myth about the US fi scal union concerns the idea that the UI system is a unitary and centralised insurance scheme with signifi cant inter-state solidarity. In reality, the estimates of the insurance effects of this UI against asymmetric shocks are likely to overestimate the true level of risk sharing. Indeed, contrary to what is often assumed, the semi-decentralised nature of the UI system in the US limits the scope for true inter-state risk sharing. unemployment insurance (UI) system is concerned, this suggests that the US system does not disproportionally benefi t the poorer states in terms of stabilisation capacity, despite different levels of structural unemployment and output growth rates.
Fiscal insurance from the US federal budget: beyond asymmetric shocks
The results presented above prompt another question, namely whether the US budget (and in particular the UI system), rather than cushioning asymmetric shocks, provides insurance against common macroeconomic shocks (i.e. stabilisation of an output shock simultaneously hitting all states). 8 In order to capture the evolution of inter-state risk sharing and total fi scal smoothing (including common shocks) over time, Figure 2 reports fi ve-year rolling window estimates of various relevant factors.
The evidence points to a signifi cant stabilising role of the US federal tax-transfer system against nationwide output fl uctuations (the difference between the dark green and light green lines). The degree of total fi scal insurance (symmetric + asymmetric shocks) fl uctuates markedly over the US business cycle. This contrasts to the remarkable steadiness of inter-state risk sharing, which remains close to ten per cent (light grey line). In fact, and against our expectations, there is a clear decreasing trend in fi scal risk sharing throughout the crisis, which indicates that the US fi scal boost primarily provided inter-temporal smoothing of aggregate shocks rather than transferring resources to the most distressed states.
In times of recessions (e.g. 2001-2002 and 2008-2009 ), discretionary fi scal stimuli enacted by Congress thus appear to have stabilised US-wide fl uctuations rather than asymmetric shocks. Stimulus packages also typically extend the duration and coverage of unemployment benefi ts. As a result, the smoothing effect (grey line) of US unemployment benefi ts is on average three times larger (from one to three per cent) when common output fl uctuations in the US are included. As can be observed by comparing the dark and grey lines, the degree of insurance provided through unemployment insurance features a remarkably similar dynamic to that of the total US budget, driven by episodes of booms and bust.
Overall, this stands in contradiction with one of the most permeable myths about the US fi scal union, namely that Inter-state risk sharing through in % in % 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 3 federal budget (left scale) Forum US-wide recessions. 13 As can be observed from the light grey bars in Figure 3 , this programme typically fi nances the bulk of the increase in benefi t spending during crises. While these are genuine transfers, since they must not be repaid by states, emergency programmes are characterised by their discretionary rather than automatic nature. As such, they have historically been activated in the face of US-wide recessions (symmetric shocks), which may explain why the UI system in the US does not seem to provide substantial insurance against asymmetric shocks.
Market and public risk-sharing mechanisms: substitutes or mutually reinforcing?
Beyond the existence of a federal tax-transfer system, another distinctive feature of the US is the much larger degree of private risk sharing through asset portfolio diversifi cation across states.
14 The difference between the EA and US is substantial in this respect: about 40% of an output shock in the US is shared through capital market diversifi cation; the equivalent fi gure in the EA is about fi ve per cent. 15 This means that the losses of failing busi- curity Act as a hybrid state-federal scheme. 10 This institutional set-up was deliberately chosen and designed to limit the degree of risk pooling and to let states have freedom over the design of UI, unlike the fully centralised UI system introduced by Canada in the same period.
11
Compared to a fully centralised system, the US system embeds two relevant particularities. First, the US Department of Labor sets broad guidelines and minimum common standards that state programmes must follow. Hence, the ultimate design and implementation is left to the discretion of states, which results in important differences in the prerequisites, duration and generosity of benefi ts among states.
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The hybrid nature of the scheme is refl ected in its funding structure, which signifi cantly constrains the scope for solidarity. Indeed, basic unemployment benefi ts are paid out of each state's UI trust fund, which is funded through state taxes. As a result, the fi gures presented above overestimate the true degree of risk sharing. The federal budget can however provide additional funding in two different ways (see net federal contribution in Figure 3 , green dashed line).
First, it can provide loans through the Treasury to fi nance states' basic unemployment insurance. This occurs when states' trust funds dry, typically during spells of prolonged high unemployment, forcing them to borrow from the federal level to fund unemployment benefi ts. It is thus a varying fraction of the green bar in Figure 3 . This system does not necessarily involve inter-state risk sharing, since loans must be repaid after two years with interest, which introduces some mild pro-cyclicality in UI fi nancing. The system is thus best understood as a federal reinsurance instrument that guarantees unemployment benefi t payments in hard times.
Second, it can grant outright transfers to fi nance emergency benefi ts (this requires action by Congress). Emergency unemployment compensation (EUC) schemes (light grey) provide genuine (discretionary) fi scal transfers, but to individuals, not states. These transfers fi nance additional weeks of unemployment benefi ts to individuals who have exhausted regular state benefi ts during periods of The nature of shocks hitting the US and EA may also explain divergences. Risk-sharing mechanisms are typically more effective in the face of transitory shocks. Hence, if shocks are more persistent in the EA than in the US, 21 output shocks will materialise in unemployment and the real economy. This would explain higher dispersion in unemployment growth rates in the EA. Labour mobility may also play a more favourable role in the US than in the EA. This is the classical adjustment mechanism to asymmetric shocks according to the optimum currency area theory, and mobility has historically been much stronger in the US than in the EA.
Overall, there are relevant reasons to believe that there is a causal link between high market risk sharing and low public risk sharing in the face of asymmetric shocks. Nevertheless, there may also be crucial mutually reinforcing dynamics between market and public risk sharing. Federal fi scal institutions can reinforce the market's willingness to share risks, 22 hence further contributing to stability. In this sense, by evaluating fi scal insurance provided by the US federal government against asymmetric shocks, we implicitly regard market-based income-smoothing as exogenous to other institutions (fi scal or not) that help man- Interestingly, in 2008-2010 this declined, whereas it sharply increased in the EA. The underlying message behind these stylised facts, and in particular the larger output dispersion observed in the US, is that diversity in a monetary union is not necessarily a weakness. With appropriate institutions to deal with risks, diversity can also turn into an opportunity to diversify and share risks in a mutually benefi cial way.
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In Figure 5 , we compare the standard deviation of changes in unemployment rates in the US and the EA. 17 The dispersion is consistently lower in the US than in the EA. In addition, with the exception of 2008-2009, it has remained remarkably stable over time. This stands in contrast with the double surge in the dispersion of unemployment among EA countries during the crisis.
The combination of high output growth dispersion and low dispersion of unemployment rate changes in the US can appear puzzling at fi rst sight. Indeed, the lower degree of employment protection in the US labour markets, compared to Europe, should lead to higher cyclical unemployment movements and hence high dispersion in changes in unemployment. 18 However, the large amount Interestingly, all of this does not necessarily make the US fi scal system a less meaningful guide for an EA fi scal capacity. Given that cyclical unemployment rate movements tend to be more asymmetric in Europe, an EA fi scal capacity along the lines of the UI system in the US could ironically provide more inter-state risk sharing than the US system does. The reinsurance of national UI schemes by a common EA fi scal entity along the lines of the role played by the US Treasury would prevent member states from cutting back social benefi ts when they were faced with diffi culties in accessing fi nancial markets. The latter point would be the single-most important added value of an EA stabiliser from a macroeconomic and social point of view, regardless of whether it helped to smooth asymmetric or symmetric shocks.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that the co-existence of different private and public risk-sharing mechanisms, some of which are hardly measurable, imply that the low amount of inter-state fi scal risk sharing may well be due to the effect of other mechanisms that spread the consequences of shocks in the US and thereby reduce the need for fi scal stabilisation. age markets. However, it is largely implausible that such an outcome can be considered exogenous due to likely positive non-measurable benefi ts from fi scal risk-sharing institutions (e.g. the Federal Deposit Insurance Company) on private risk sharing in the US.
Concluding remarks and policy implications
This contribution shows that the macroeconomic stabilisation role of US federal fi scal stabilisers in the face of asymmetric shocks, and most prominently the role of UI, is largely overstated in the current debate. We argue that those looking at the US fi scal union as a guide for designing an EA fi scal capacity based on the optimum currency area paradigms tend to derive policy prescriptions that are inconsistent with the function of fi scal institutions in the US.
A high degree of inter-state fi scal risk sharing is not necessarily a precondition for a stable and resilient monetary union. In fact, the discretionary character of US fi scal policy leads to a signifi cant degree of stabilisation against common output fl uctuations. This is also the case for the UI system in the US: fi scal transfers at the federal level only take place in response to large US-wide recessions. This suggests that the main benefi ts from a fi scal stabiliser may arise in the face of such large nationwide recessions, when
